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I. INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
"'
11
"'
1
"
0 Idaho Association of Commerce and Industry (IACI) is a 
association representing over 300 diverse businesses in the state ofldaho. Together IACI's 
members employ approximately 200,000 employees within Idaho. IACI is devoted to shaping 
public policy in Idaho and advocating on behalf of its members before the Idaho legislature, 
various regulatory bodies, and the courts. IACI's essential aim is to support economic grovvth for 
the benefit of its employer members and their employees. 
IACI and its members have a significant interest in this appeal because it raises important 
issues regarding the administration of the Idaho worker's compensation law. At issue is the 
meaning and reach of a limited exception to the exclusivity of the worker's compensation 
remedy-where an employee's injury or death is caused by "wilful or unprovoked physical 
aggression of the employer." Idaho Code§ 72-209(3). According to Appellants, "wilful or 
unprovoked physical aggression" includes egregious, endangering conduct that goes beyond 
mere negligence. 
IACI has no direct interest, financial or otherwise, in the outcome of the case. But it 
believes Appellants' reading of "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" is based on a 
misunderstanding of the plain language used in Idaho Code§ 72-209(3) and the Court's 
precedent. IACI also believes Appellants' view, if accepted, will undermine the compromise that 
underlies the exclusivity of the Idaho worker's compensation law. IACI files this amicus curiae 
1 This brief was authored by IACI and its counsel alone. It was not authored by counsel 
for either party. Only IACI and its members made financial contributions to prepare and submit 
this brief. 
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Respondents to interest in preserving that compromise and 
that has guided its members in their employee relationships for many years. 
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
IACI writes separately to focus the Court's attention on the purpose and history of the 
Idaho worker's compensation law and how Idaho Code§ 72-209(3) operates within the law's 
larger statutory framework. The worker's compensation law was enacted in 191 7 and updated 
and recodified in 1971. The 1971 law retains many of the key elements of the 1917 law, 
including the unique declaration of police power that withdraws common law liability for work-
related accidents. By replacing common law remedies, the law creates an exclusive remedy for 
injured employees and exclusive liability for employers. In effect, the law crafts a careful 
compromise that grants employees sure and certain relief without regard to fault, while limiting 
and fixing the liability of employers. 
As part of the recodification of the law in 1971, the Idaho legislature enacted Idaho Code 
§ 72-209(3). The provision creates a limited exception to the employer's exclusive liability for 
injuries or death caused by "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." Appellants contend 
"wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" includes any conduct that goes beyond mere 
negligence, such as gross or reckless conduct. That reading of Section 72-209(3) is contrary to 
the provision's plain meaning and is not supported by the Court's precedent, which interprets the 
exception to require an offensive action or hostile attack and actual intent to cause injury. 
As explained below, any other reading of Section 72-209(3) would erode the 
exclusiveness of the worker's compensation remedy and undermine the very foundation of the 
- 2 -
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compromise between employer and employee. The Court should adhere to the 
plain meaning to further the policy of the Idaho worker's compensation law. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Idaho worker's compensation law creates an exclusive remedy for employees 
and exciusive iiabiiity for empioyers and thus aboiishes civii actions for workpiace 
injuries, excepted for limited exceptions. 
The background and evolution of the Idaho worker's compensation law provide a larger, 
more comprehensive legal framework that merits the Court's attention. That history explains 
how Idaho Code§ 72-209(3) operates within the larger statutory framework of the law. It also 
supports the plain meaning of the "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" exception and the 
Court's long-standing precedent interpreting that language. 
1. In 1917, Idaho enacted a worker's compensation law that provided relief to 
injured workers regardless of fault and to the exclusion of common law 
remedies. 
The Idaho worker's compensation law was enacted in 1917. See 1917 Idaho Sess. Laws, 
ch. 81, p. 252. It created a compulsory, exclusive compensation system where an employer was 
generally liable to a worker who "receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the 
course of any employment covered by this Act .... " Id. § 4, p. 256; see also id. § 6, p. 256. To 
establish the system, the law invoked the state's police power and withdrew the common law 
remedies workers had against their employers for workplace injuries. Id.§ l(b), pp. 254-55; see 
also id. § 6, p. 256. The Court has referred to the worker's compensation remedy as the 
"exclusive remedy rule." Dominguez ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen Resources, Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 11, 
121 P.3d 938, 942 (2005). 
- 3 -
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declaring the state's police power, explained why it was 
to establish a compulsory and exclusive worker's compensation system. §l(b),pp. 
254-55. Idaho's welfare depended on its industries and the welfare of its workers. Id.§ l(b), p. 
254. Yet when workers were injured in workplace accidents, the common law system resulted in 
"little of the cost to the employer" reaching the injured worker, "at large expense to the public." 
Id. The remedies afforded by the common law system were "uncertain, slow and inadequate." Id. 
On the other hand, a compulsory compensation system would provide "sure and certain relief for 
injured workmen ... regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, 
proceeding or compensation." Id. 
2. In 1971, the Idaho legislature updated and recodified the worker's 
compensation law based on the 1917 Idaho law and a model worker's 
compensation law. 
In 1969, the Idaho legislature recognized the need to study and modernize the worker's 
compensation law "to meet the changing conditions in the state's industrial growth." 1969 Idaho 
Sess. Laws, S.C.R. No. 112, p. 1371. The legislature directed the Idaho legislative council to 
"conduct ... a comprehensive study of the entire field of workmen's compensation" and to 
include "a recodification" of the existing law." Id. The legislative council met over the next two 
years and engaged a special advisory committee of experts on worker's compensation 
representing business, labor, and other interests.2 See, e.g., App. B;3 App.Fat 3-4.4 
1970). 
2 An appendix accompanies IACI's amicus curiae brief. 
3 Minutes, Legislative Council, Committee on Workmen's Compensation (June 2, 1969). 
4 Minutes, Legislative Council, Committee on Workmen's Compensation (Apr. 10, 
- 4 -
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Section by Section Commentary, a model worker's compensation 
law prepared in 1963 and 1965 by the Council of State Governments (the "Model Law"). 5 See 
App.Bat 4; App. C.6 The Model Law was drafted by an advisory committee chaired by 
Professor Arthur Larson, a leading authority on worker's compensation law.7 App. A at iii.8 
Because it combined what was considered to be the best elements of various worker's 
compensation statutes, the Model Law differed in material respects from the existing Idaho 
worker's compensation law. See id. at 2-3; App. C. 
Attempting to reconcile those differences-and considering whether and how to follow 
the Model Law-led to much debate within the legislative council and the special advisory 
committee. See, e.g., App. D at 2-3;9 App. E; 10 App. J. 11 Ultimately, in 1971, the Idaho 
5 The legislative council retained E. B. Smith, a former Chief Justice of the Court, to 
review and compare the Model Law and the existing Idaho worker's compensation law. See App. 
Bat 4. 
6 E. B. Smith, Comparative Studies of Model Code with Idaho's Workmen's 
Compensation and Occupation Disease Compensation Laws (Aug. 15, 1969). 
7 Prof. Larson, the author of The Law on Workmen's Compensation Law and more recent 
editions, was regarded as the foremost authority in the United States on workmen's 
compensation. See Harmon v. Lute's Constr. Co., 112 Idaho 291,305, 732 P.2d 260,273 (1986) 
(recognizing Mr. Larson as leading authority on worker's compensation law). 
8 Council of State Governments, Workmen's Compensation and Rehabilitation Law with 
Section by Section Commentary (1965). 
9 Minutes, Legislative Council, Committee on Workmen's Compensation (Aug. 22, 
1969). 
10 E. B. Smith, Policy Issues Raised by Proposed Adoption of the Plan of the Model Code 
as a Pattern for Idaho's Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease Compensation Act 
(Sept. 20, 1969). 
11 Letter from E. B. Smith to Chairman of Legislative Counsel, Committee on 
Workmen's Compensation (Dec. 15, 1970). 
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enacted a worker's compensation law that, while adopting elements of the Model 
remains true to the 1917 law many respects. See 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 124, p. 422. 
Importantly, the legislature retained the unique declaration of police power and its 
pronouncement of a compulsory and exclusive worker's compensation system to provide "sure 
and certain relief for injured workmen ... regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of 
every other remedy, proceeding or compensation."12 Idaho Code§ 72-201. The legislature also 
maintained the statement of the exclusivity of the employee's remedy for a compensable injury, 
see Idaho Code§ 72-211, and adopted a new provision addressing the exclusiveness of the 
employer's liability, see Idaho Code§ 72-209(1). 
3. The 1971 law also allowed common law actions in the event "injury or death 
[was] proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked physical aggression of 
the employer." 
In addition to adding Idaho Code § 72-209(1 ), the 1971 law added a limited exception to 
the exclusive liability rule. Idaho Code § 72-209(3) allows workers to maintain common law 
actions "where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked physical 
aggression of the employer." Unknown to the 1917 law, the new language derived from Section 
IO(a) of the Model Law. 13 See App. A at 24. 
12 The only change to the declaration was the exclusion of the three sentences that 
explained the difficulties, in 1917, in administering the common law system to remedy 
workplace injuries-that "little of the cost to the employer" reached the injured worker, the 
"large expense to the public," and the "uncertain, slow and inadequate" remedies. Compare 1917 
Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 81, § l(b), p. 254 with Idaho Code§ 72-201. 
13 Idaho Code§ 72-209(1) and (2) also derive from Section lO(a) of the Model Law . 
. - 6 -
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O(a) Model 
common law liability and how the exclusivity can lost the injury is proximately caused 
by "willful and unprovoked physical aggression": 
The exemption from liability given an employer by this section shall also extend 
to such employer's carrier and to all employees, officers or directors of such 
employer or carrier, provided the exemption from liability given an employee, 
officer or director of an employer or carrier shall not apply in any case where the 
injury or death is proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical 
aggression of such employee, officer or director. 
Section 72-209(3) largely reads the same, extending the employer's exemption to employees and 
corporate officers and providing an exception to the exclusivity for injury proximately caused by 
"wilful or unprovoked physical aggression": 
The exemption from liability given an employer by this section shall also extend 
to the employer's surety and to all officers, agents, servants and employees of the 
employer or surety, provided that such exemptions from liability shall not apply 
in any case where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or 
unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or 
employees .... 
But unlike the Model Law, Section 72-209(3) also includes a caveat that emphasizes the nature 
of the conduct covered by the exception--only ''the aggressor" can lose the exemption from 
common law suit. The provision continues: "the loss of such exemption applying only to the 
aggressor and shall not be imputable to the employer unless provoked or authorized by the 
employer, or the employer was a party thereto."14 Idaho Code § 72-209(3). 
14 Sam Kaufman, representing the Self-Insurers Association, advocated that particular 
change to Section IO(a) of the Model Law. See App. G at 1 & "appendix A" (at 21A); App.Hat 
3; App. I at 3 & "appendix D". 
- 7 -
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Reading "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" to mean any conduct greater 
than negligence would erode the policy behind the worker's compensation remedy, 
is contrary to the plain words of Idaho Code § 72-209(3), and would conflict with 
the Court's precedent. 
As Prof. Larson recognizes in his treatise,"[ e ]xclusiveness is a compensation law 
question, not a tort law question. It is based on compensation policy." 9 Arthur Larson et al., 
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law§ 103.03 (2015). To that end, the history of the Idaho 
worker's compensation law offers an important view of how the exclusivity exception for "wilful 
or unprovoked physical aggression" fits within the law's larger framework. 
As discussed, the Idaho legislature expressly declared the policy behind the law, in both 
1917 and 1971, to provide an exclusive remedy for injuries caused by accidents arising out of 
and in the course of employment. See, e.g., Idaho Code§§ 72-201, 72-209, 72-211. That policy 
embodies a compromise that provides sure and certain relief to injured employees regardless of 
questions of fault, while limiting the liability of employers. See Stample v. Idaho Power Co., 92 
Idaho 763,766,450 P.2d 610,613 (1969) (describing purpose oflaw "to provide 'not only for 
employees a remedy which is both expeditious and independent of proof of fault, but also for 
employers a liability which is limited and determinative"' (citation omitted)); Jvfeisner v. Potlach 
Corp., 131 Idaho 258,262,954 P.2d 676,680 (1998) (same). 
Within that framework, the Idaho legislature enacted Idaho Code § 72-209(3) as a limited 
exception to the employer's exclusive liability. Appellants, however, seek to expand the meaning 
of "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" to include "egregious, endangering conduct by an 
employer that went into that realm of conduct beyond bare negligence." See Appellant's Reply 
- 8 -
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"wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" cannot be read that way. 
view contrary to the plain meaning of the language, it would subject employers to 
greater tort liability than the legislature contemplated and increase litigation involving work-
related injuries. That would undoubtedly unbalance the careful compromise between employer 
and employee that underlies the Idaho worker's compensation law. 
The Court seemingly shares that view, as it has read "wilful or unprovoked physical 
aggression" narrowly, according to its plain meaning, and thereby preserved the law's 
compromise. In Kearney v. Denker, an injured worker argued that Section 72-209(3) applied 
IS 
because the employer was "'willfully, wantonly and grossly negligent, which negligence was so 
extreme as to be substantially certain to injure someone."' 114 Idaho 755, 756, 760 P.2d 1171, 
1172 (1988). The Court disagreed: "[t]he word 'aggression' connotes 'an offensive action' such 
as an 'overt hostile attack.' Webster's Third New International Dictionary 41 (1969). To prove 
aggression there must be evidence of some offensive action or hostile attack." Id. at 757, 760 
P.2d at 1173. Thus the Court explained: "It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor 
committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury would occur." 15 Id. 
15 In Kearney, the Court also observed that Idaho Code§ 72-209(3) "require[s] an 
intention to injure the employee." 114 Idaho at 758, 760 P.2d at 1174. The concept of willfulness 
was not foreign to the 1917 or 1971 Idaho law, nor to the Model Law. Under the 1917 law, the 
worker's compensation remedy did not cover an injury caused "by the employee's wilful 
intention to injure himself or to injure another." 1917 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 81, § 5(1 ), p. 256; 
see also Idaho Code§ 72-208(1). The Model Law contained an identical provision. See App. A 
at 16 (§ l(c)). According to the comments of the Model Law, "[w]illfulness requires 
deliberation, calculated, determined, and stubborn persistence in a particular course in order to 
satisfy the will of the actor." Id. at 81, (cmt. to§ l(c)); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1773 
- 9 -
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DeMoss v. City of Coeur 'Alene, 
vau.,11;c:. a substantial certainty test into Idaho Code§ 72-209(3). 118 Idaho 176, 795 P.2d 875 
(1990). There the plaintiffs brought a civil suit against their employer alleging the employer was 
liable for assault and battery following the employees' exposure to asbestos. Id. at 178, 795 P.2d 
at 877. The employees argued that the employer knew of the danger, lied to the plaintiffs about 
the existence of the danger, and failed to provide adequate safety equipment to protect from the 
danger, and that these actions were "tantamount to an 'offensive action or hostile attack."' Id. 
Citing Kearney, the Court disagreed, again holding "there must be evidence of some offensive 
action or hostile attack." Id. 
There is also additional support for requiring such evidence. Under Idaho Section 72-
209(3), the legislature only allows civil liability to be imputed to the actual "aggressor"; liability 
is not imputed to the employer unless the employer provoked or authorized the physical 
aggression. "Aggressor" means "[o]ne who first employs hostile force"; "[t]he party who first 
offers violence or offense"; and "[h]e who begins a quarrel or dispute, either by threatening or 
striking another."16 Black's Law Dictionary 87 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Liability is thus limited to the 
person who employs, provokes, or authorizes the hostile attack or offensive action. Such 
individualized fault does not neatly equate to allegations of egregious, gross, or reckless 
misconduct, like Appellants' allegations, or an employer's failure to follow safety standards. 
(rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining "willful": "Intending the result which actually comes to pass; 
designed; intentional; not accidental or involuntary."). 
16 The term "provoked" also connotes aggression. See Black's Law Dictionary 1390 (rev. 
4th ed. 1968) (defining "provoked": "To excite; to stimulate; to arouse. To irritate, or enrage."). 
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Justice Huntley's concurrence in Kearney and the Court's decision in Dominquez do 
not adopt a "substantially certain" test and do not hold that "wilful or unprovoked 
physical aggression" means egregious or endangering conduct beyond negligence. 
The parties have addressed Justice Huntley's concurrence in Kearney. They have also 
debated the Court's ruling in Dominguez, 142 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938, and its unique procedural 
posture. IACI has little additional perspective to offer to those arguments except for three 
observations. 
First, it would be helpful to view Justice Huntley's concurrence within the context and 
trends of its times. Setting himself apart from the majority in Kearney, Justice Huntley promoted 
a "substantial certainty" test, arguing that an intentional tort includes acts "'committed with the 
belief that such injury is substantially certain to occur."' 114 Idaho at 758, 760 P.2d at 1174 
(Huntley, J. concurring) ( citation and emphasis omitted). From there, he stated that, in his view, 
"an employer's knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe working environment would ... 
rise to the level of wilful physical aggression." Id. 
Justice Huntley crafted his concurrence at a time-Kearney was decided in 1988-when 
several states were adopting a substantial certainty test to judge whether an employer's 
intentional torts justified the loss of the exclusive liability under worker's compensation laws. 
For instance, as one example, Justice Huntley cited Jones v. VIP Development Co., 4 72 N .E.2d 
' 
1046 (Ohio 1984) (holding that employee could seek common law damages for intentional tort 
committed with belief that injury is substantially certain to occur). 17 114 Idaho at 758, 760 P.2d 
17 During that time, other states also expanded their definition of intentional torts to 
include conduct that is substantially certain to cause an injury. See, e.g., Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 
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today, the vast majority of states have rejected a substantial test. 9 
's Workers' Compensation Law§ 103.03 n.l; see also id. § 103.04[4] (advising 
jurisdictions to avoid "this superficially attractive test"). And even Jones was superseded by 
statute. See Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials NA., Inc., 983 N.E.2d 1253, 1258 (Ohio 2012) 
(noting that statutory amendment "harmonize[ d] the law of this state with the law that governs a 
clear majority of jurisdictions"). 
Second, DeMoss was issued in 1990, nearly two years after Kearney. Despite that 
opportunity, the Court did not adopt, discuss, or even recognize Justice Huntley's concurrence. 
See DeMoss, 118 Idaho 176, 795 P.2d 875. 
Third, had the Court meant to adopt, in Dominguez, Justice Huntley's concurrence and 
the substantially certain test, one would presume that the Court would have done so directly and 
explicitly. The Court must follow controlling precedent "'unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it 
has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate 
plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.'" Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 
Idaho 239,240, 953 P.2d 989, 990 (1998) (citation omitted). Dominguez, however, contains no 
such discussion. The decision does not expressly overturn or limit the rulings in Kearney and 
DeMoss. Nor does it actually refer to a "substantially certain" test or similarly worded test. 18 
So.2d 475,482 (La. 1981); Millison v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505 (N.J. 
1985); Woodson v. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222,228 (N.C. 1991). 
18 In contrast, Jones and other decisions adopting the substantially certain test fully 
debated their precedent and the virtues of adopting the test. See supra n. 17. 
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Appellants' reading of "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" would the 
and policies underlying the Idaho worker's compensation act. 
The Idaho legislature invoked its police power to create a no-fault worker's compensation 
system. Given the important policies that underlie the worker's compensation law, "'anything 
that tends to erode the exclusiveness of either the liability or the recovery strikes at the very 
foundation of statutory schemes of this kind, now universally accepted and acknowledged."' 
Stample, 92 Idaho at 766,450 P.2d at 613 (citation omitted). Stretching "wilful or unprovoked 
physical aggression" to mean conduct beyond basic negligence to avoid the exclusive remedy 
rule would unbalance the law and undermine the fundamental compromise between employer 
and employee. Such a reading would weaken the legislature's true intent to adopt the limited 
exclusivity exception, would encourage greater litigation, and would subject employers to 
greater tort liability than the legislature contemplated. 
For those reasons, in Kearney and DeMoss, the Court correctly limited Idaho Code§ 72-
209(3) to the plain meaning of the legislature's language. The history and purpose of the law 
align perfectly with the plain language of the exception and with the Court's precedent. As Prof. 
Larson recognized, in the no-fault system, "[e]xclusiveness is a compensation law question, not a 
tort law question. It is based on compensation policy." 9 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law 
§ 103.03. Vital is the policy that underlies and grounds the worker's compensation law. 
The Idaho legislature could have chosen to aliow an employee to seek common law 
damages where an accidental injury was caused by gross or reckless conduct or some other form 
of heightened negligence that includes violating a safety standard or law. But it did not. Instead 
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limited common law suits to injuries or death caused by "physical aggression" and 
an actual intent to injure. The Court cannot amend Idaho Code§ 73-209(3), by way of judicial 
decision, to allow common law actions "where the injury or death is proximately caused by the 
wilful or unprovoked physical aggression or the gross negligence or recklessness of the 
employer or its officers, agents, servants or employees." 
IV. CONCLUSION 
IACI requests that the Court affirm Kearney and DeMoss and reaffirm that "wilful or 
unprovoked physical aggression" requires evidence of offensive action or a hostile attack. In 
addition, IACI urges the Court to clarify and limit Dominguez to its facts. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of March, 2016. 
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